Toh 128 — Appearing Differently to All While Not Departing from Emptiness, the Essence of the True Nature of Things
Dharmatāsvabhāvaśūnyatācalapratisarvāloka
The Noble Sūtra
Appearing Differently to All While Not Departing from Emptiness, the Essence of the True Nature of Things
F.171.aHomage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas.
Thus did I hear at one time. At the Dharma Abode of the King of Deer,[1] upon a great throne of various precious substances arising from the qualities of his wisdom, the Blessed One was seated without departing from the essence of the true nature of things just as it is.
At that time, limitless, innumerable great bodhisattvas and a great host of gods, humans, asuras, and others were also assembled at that place. Those gathered there all made repeated circumambulations of and prostrations toward the Blessed One, then each took their place and, having paid respectful homage, given veneration, and made excellent offerings, with their heads bowed, they began to listen to the Dharma without weariness.
At that time, although the Blessed One formed no thought of teaching a formulation or elucidation of the Dharma, by the power of his compassion and vow, everyone in that audience heard him speak according to their own individual inclinations and attitudes. They thought, “The Blessed One is teaching the Dharma to me, not to others.”
And so, some among that great gathering thought, (1) “He teaches the Dharma that things are just as they appear,”[2] and taking it as certain, they formed that notion.
Some thought, (2) “He teaches the Dharma that all things are nothing other than mind alone,”[3] and taking it as certain, they formed that notion.
Some thought, (3) “He teaches us the Dharma that even mind itself is unborn,”[4] and taking it as certain, they formed that notion.
Some F.171.b thought, (4) “He teaches the Dharma that all things appear like illusions and, like illusions, do not exist,”[5] and taking it as certain, they formed that notion.
Some thought, (5) “He teaches the Dharma that all things are by nature unborn, by essence nonabiding, and being without all delimitations of action and activity,[6] transcend concepts and the objects of conceptualization, and are completely free of elaboration from beginningless time,”[7] and taking it as certain, they formed that notion.
Then, without departing from the essence of the true nature of things just as they are, the Blessed One took on a compassionate form,[8] and light rays called clearing the darkness of conceptualization from those assembled who have different views shone forth from his tongue. The light rays were visible in all ten directions, and this roused the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, who was there in that audience. Being aware that most of the audience held the five different understandings, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī thought, “Why are there different views and beliefs regarding a single basis of all things? I will ask the Blessed One.”
When those light rays had gathered back again into the tongue of the Blessed One, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī asked the Blessed One, “Although the Blessed One formed no thought of teaching a formulation or elucidation of the Dharma, why, Blessed One, do those assembled here have different beliefs and notions? Blessed One, are these five analytic positions concerning things[9] all correct, or are some correct and some incorrect? Are these five analytic positions concerning things equal when it comes to the attainment of complete liberation, or, Blessed One, do these five analytic positions relate to different types of persons?[10] Is there some suitable analogy, Blessed One, F.172.a for how these five analytic positions appear different? In the future, Blessed One, will there still be people who will understand things according to each of these five analytic positions? Blessed One, will people who train in these five analytic positions argue about what they do and do not mean? Blessed One, so as to banish the doubts of those gathered here, please explain.”
This is what he said, and the Blessed One replied, “Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Although the Blessed One formed no thought of teaching a formulation or elucidation of the Dharma, why do those assembled here have different beliefs and notions?’ Regarding that, because of their purification through practice,[11] or lack thereof, there are those with greater or lesser degrees of understanding and aptitude. Because buddhas have purification and accumulation that is limitless, they remain at all times, effortlessly, without departing from the essence of the true nature of things just as they are. This is the experiential domain of all buddhas. Since those of greater purification and those of just a little purification similarly acquire that which is correct and that which is incorrect from their lineage, they will have different beliefs and notions.
“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Are these five analytic positions concerning things all correct, or are some correct and some incorrect?’ Regarding that, when all of these five analytic positions concerning things are taken as correct, there are some who think that the Dharma that has been taught is that all things exist just as they appear. Why? This is because the four elements and what they produce exist like different illusions.
“There are also some who think that the Dharma that has been taught is that all things are nothing other than mind alone. Why? This is because the habitual tendencies of the mind to assign permanence to various imputed things make it appear that those things persist through time as a self or as a thing, F.172.b even though they are merely conventional designations that in reality are without intrinsic nature and do not exist beyond mere mind.
“There are also some who think that the Dharma taught to us is that even mind itself is unborn. Why? This is because it has no form or color, no past, present, or future, and no center or edges.
“There are also some who think that the Dharma that has been taught is that all things appear like illusions and, like illusions, do not exist. Why? This is because all things arise from causes and conditions.
“There are also some who think that the Dharma that has been taught is that all things are inherently unborn, essentially nonabiding, and, being without all delimitations of action and activity, they transcend concepts and the objects of conceptualization, and are completely free of elaboration from beginningless time. Why? This is because that is the essential nature of all things without any distortion.
“Mañjuśrī, there are also some who have not grasped the positions correctly. These are the understandings[12] of those of lesser purification, inferior aptitude, and poor discernment. There are also some of middling purification, aptitude, and discernment who have such understandings. The rest are correct in their understanding, which is excellent.
“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Are these five analytic positions concerning things equal when it comes to the attainment of complete liberation?’ Regarding that, apart from the correct understanding of those whose discernment is excellent, the other four positions, though sequentially distinct in terms of their proximity to the correct understanding, may be seen as equal when it comes to the attainment of complete liberation.
“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Are these five analytic positions concerning things for different kinds of people?’ Regarding that, once they have progressed through four of the five analytic positions concerning things, both those who follow the Lesser Vehicle and those who follow the Great Vehicle will realize that only the last one reflects the correct, undistorted experiential domain of the buddhas.
“Mañjuśrī, you asked, F.173.a ‘Is there a suitable analogy for how these five different analytic positions concerning things appear?’ Regarding that, the rising of the sun over Jambudvīpa is an analogy that illustrates how there are different understandings concerning the single basis of things. When the ascending sun rises over Jambudvīpa from the sky forty thousand yojanas away, everyone thinks that the sun is rising over their own town from their own mountain. In the same way, everyone present at this gathering has their own notions concerning the single basis of things. Everyone sees it in their own way, and everyone grasps it in their own way.
“Just as one cannot say without analysis that the sun does not rise from the mountain of one’s own town, Mañjuśrī, in the same way, these other four analytic positions concerning things likewise appear—aside from the correct, undistorted experiential domain of the buddhas.
“Just as it is not the case that the sun truly rises from the mountain of one’s own town, Mañjuśrī, in the same way, the four positions appear as stages of realization even though they do not convey the true meaning.
“How these five analyses are comparable with regard to attaining complete liberation, Mañjuśrī, may be illustrated by the analogy of valuable gems. For, with regard to valuing gems, too, there are those who rely on this work and those who do not.[13] People with no notions and those with wrong notions, who do not depend on the five analytic views concerning things, are like those people who do not do this work and so do not find anything valuable. Those who find no meaning in them do not think to examine them, and thus they will not be liberated from the three realms.
“As for those who do such work, however, there are those who are specialist collectors,[14] those who collect many, and those who collect just a few. Just as their gems will be valued in three tiers, so, too, may the correct and undistorted position, the other four positions, and the analyses of the Lesser Vehicle and Great Vehicle likewise be evaluated in three levels, as in the analogy.[15]
“An analogy to illustrate how I have expounded the twelve types of discourses[16] and the five analytic positions concerning things is the way that rivers descend in four directions from the great lake.[17]F.173.b Although the four rivers, each with many tributaries, descend in four directions, they are united in descending[18] from the great lake, and thus the great lake is the foundation of all the rivers flowing in the four directions—it is what they have in common. In the same way, though the five analytic positions concerning things are different, they are reliant upon the twelve types of discourses that I have expounded, and thus the twelve types of discourses are their foundation—are what they have in common.
“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘In the future, will there still be people who will understand things according to each of these five analytic positions?’ Regarding that, if, while I am still teaching on the essence of things just as they are, there are those in the assembled audience who acquire different notions in this way, then, after I have passed beyond suffering, there will not only be such differences, there will be many more! Mañjuśrī, for five hundred years after I have passed beyond suffering, and for nine hundred, and for one thousand nine hundred, and for two thousand, and for two thousand five hundred years, there will still be successive generations of people with their own notions regarding these five analytic positions concerning things.
“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Will people who train in these five analytic positions concerning things argue about what they do and do not mean?’ Indeed, in the future, once I have passed beyond suffering, they will argue for five hundred years. At that time, because of the greater or lesser level of people’s aptitude and discernment, and irrespective of whether or not they have understood the undistorted meaning, they will be sure about what is not the true meaning, and having established what is and is not the meaning espoused by others, they will argue. And when they present their arguments in front of others, those who listen to them, even without intending to be adherents of positions, will become adherents of positions based on their regional affiliations and kinship.
“Even those who know the undistorted meaning will argue, not for the sake of teaching those who do not know, but for the sake of disheartening and dissecting the views of others. They will demand, ‘Explain how you see the essence of your meaning!’ Although the answers may not be wrong, they will be disputed based on other discourses, F.174.a and with cries of, ‘You said this,’ they will proclaim the mistakes of others. They will think, ‘How pleasant it is when others do not know, and I alone know.’ They will proclaim such things not for the sake of enlightenment, but for the sake of material things.”
This is what he said. Then Mañjuśrī asked, “Blessed One, if these five analytic positions concerning things, though different, rest on a single basis of things, then what is that basis of things? If whichever way one examines, one is still deluded, then what is the unmistaken essence?”
The Blessed One replied, “Mañjuśrī, the basis is the aggregates, the elements, the constituents, and the sense fields. However, one will be mistaken if one takes even these things as permanent and unchanging, since they too are like illusions and are merely conventional designations. If one examines what is inherently unborn without being clear about its appearance as a conventional designation, one will also be mistaken. The basis, the unmistaken essence, is the inherently unborn state of those things.”[19]
Mañjuśrī asked, “If the basis of delusory sensory objects does not exist, then how is it that there is what is known as the appearance of delusory sensory objects?”
The Buddha replied, “Understand that things are like illusions, merely conventional designations that are perceived by the deluded mind as existing. Not apprehending this, and not understanding that things are inherently unborn, objects of perception that appear to the deluded mind as deluded perceptions are seized upon as permanent and unchanging things. Why must you understand this? Because one remains in saṃsāra if one takes things as permanent and unchanging. If one is in saṃsāra, the aggregates, the constituents, and the sense fields will exist. If these exist, there will be the experience of joy and sorrow. However, if one is aware that things are inherently unborn, and one has cleared away both the extremes—of permanent unchanging substantiality and of the nonexistence and negation of things—[20] then one will reach the highest perfect and complete awakening. With that, the attainments, the major and minor marks, and the buddhafields in their complete perfection will appear. F.174.b
“In brief, Mañjuśrī, not understanding the inherently unborn nature of things, grasping to things as permanent and unchanging, and being in saṃsāra—this is what is known as the perception of the deluded mind toward the appearance of things. However, it is not the case that things appear from nothingness, like primordial space, by the power of the deluded mind alone. Even in the perception of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, by means of pure and impure vision, Mañjuśrī, the object of perception is known as an appearance to the mind.”
This is what he taught, and the audience gathered there rejoiced and greatly praised what the Blessed One had said.
This concludes “The Sūtra on All Things Appearing Differently While Not Departing from the Essence of the True Nature of Things.”[21]Colophon
Translated, edited, and finalized by the Indian preceptor Dānaśīla and Bandé Yeshé Dé. It is said that Dānaśīla himself said that the piṭaka treatises and different views of Madhyamaka developed from this.[22]
Notes
ri dags kyi rgyal po’i chos kyi khang pa na. This locale does not appear to be attested in any other sūtra.
backji ltar snang ba bzhin du yod pa. This common-sense view might broadly be construed as resembling the philosophical realism later associated with Vaibhāṣika. Precisely how this sūtra should be understood in relation to the development of doxographical categories to describe different philosophical positions remains unclear.
backchos thams cad sems tsam las ma gtogs par gzhan med pa. This second view bears resemblance to the Cittamātra (Tib. sems tsam, “mind only”) position often associated with Yogācāra.
backsems nyid kyang ma skyes pa yin pa. The third, fourth, and fifth views bear some resemblance to Madhyamaka views.
backchos thams cad sgyu ma bzhin du snang zhing sgyu ma bzhin du ma grub pa. This fourth view brings to mind the Indian subclassification of Madhyamaka into the Māyopamavāda (Tib. sgyu ma lta bur ’dod pa) and Apratiṣṭhānavāda philosophical positions discussed in Almogi 2010.
backThe phrase las dang bya ba’i mtha’ thams cad dang bral ba is unusual and could be interpreted in various ways. The words las and bya ba can translate the Sanskrit karman and kriyā, respectively “the act” and “the performance of the act.” The Tibetan bya ba, as a future optative form of the verb “to do,” can also denote “that which is to be done” or “duty,” and often translates the Sanskrit words kārya and kṛtya. The Tibetan term mtha’ is used to translate both the Sanskrit terms anta and koṭi and can cover a semantic range from “extreme” to “limit,” “boundary,” “scope,” or “end.” The term mtha’ is also used in some contexts for “position” or “view,” as in “the established position” (Tib. grub mtha’, Skt siddhānta), and this is a use also encountered in this text. The most likely interpretation here, in the context of the true nature of things, is to see in this a reference to the Sanskrit compound kartṛkarmakriyā, “the actor, the act, and the performance (of the act).” As such, the phrase is about the absence of duality: “without all (dualistic distinction between) the extremes of deed and doing.”
backchos thams cad rang bzhin ma skyes pa/ ngo bo nyid kyis mi gnas pa/ las dang bya ba’i mtha’ thams cad dang bral ba rtog pa dang rtog pa’i yul las ’das pa/ thog ma med pa’i dus nas spros pa rnam par dag pa. This fifth and last position has been cited by several influential Tibetan figures, as mentioned in the introduction.
backsnying rje dang ldan pa’i skur byas nas. Translation tentative. The Yongle and Peking Kangyurs here have bkur (“praise”) rather than the Degé Kangyur’s skur (“in form/body”).
backchos la brtags pa’i mtha’ lnga po. Here and passim the Stok Palace Kangyur has the alternative reading chos la brtags pa’i thabs lnga po, “five methods for analyzing things.” Although this might be considered a preferable reading, for consistency we have followed the Degé reading.
backgang zag gi rigs ni [du] mchis lags sam. The additional du is present in both the Narthang and Stok Palace Kangyurs.
backsbyangs pa dang ma sbyangs pa dbang las. In Tibetan, the meaning of the verb sbyong (past: sbyangs) covers both “purify” (Skt. viśodhana) and “practice” (abhyāsa).” In the absence of an English equivalent with the same semantic field, we have opted here for “purification through practice” at first use, and then simply “purification” in what follows.
backThe Degé Kangyur reads rtog pa, “notions,” but according to the Comparative Edition the most common reading in other recensions, as well as the Stok Palace version, is rtogs pa, “understanding,” in common with the following lines. Therefore, we have opted for the latter.
backThe translation of this whole analogy is tentative. It is not clear what bsten pa’i las refers to here and passim. The interpretation adopted is that it refers to the work of evaluating gemstones. Tib. rin po che de yang sems can rnams kyis bsten pa’i las byas pa dang ma byas pa yod de/ gang zag rtog pa med pa dang log par rtog pa rnams ni chos la brtag pa’i mtha’ lnga la mi brten [var.: rten; Stok: sten] pa ste/ rin po che bsten pa’i las ma byas pa’i gang zag gis rin po che ma rnyed [Yongle: mi snyed; Narthang, Lhasa: mi rnyed] pa dang dgos pa mi ’byung ba [+de] bzhin du de dag la mi dpyod mi sems pas khams gsum las mi thar ba yin no/.
backkhyad par du bsags pa. Here the Stok Palace version reads khyam par du bsags pa.
backTranslation tentative. bsten pa’i las byas pa ni khyad par du bsags pa dang cher bsags pa dang cung zad bsags pa rnams la rin po che’i dgos pa yang rim pa gsum du ’byung ba bzhin du yang dag pa phyin ci ma log pa dang lhag ma bzhi po brgyud par brtag pa theg pa che chung rim pa gsum yang dpe rim pa bzhin no.
backmdo sde bcu gnyis. This appears to be a reference to the “twelve branches of the teachings” more commonly known in Tibetan as gsung rab yan lag bcu gnyis (Skt. dvādaśāṅgapravacana).
backWhile the Degé Kangyur here reads rgya mtsho la, “to the ocean (or great lake),” which makes sense, the Stok Palace Kangyur reads rgya mtsho nas, “from the great lake.” This latter reading has been preferred since the directional prepositions in the Degé reading seem internally contradictory later in the analogy, and the passage appears to allude to classical Indian cosmology whereby the four great rivers (Gaṅgā, Sindhu, Vakṣu, and Sītā) flow through Jambudvīpa from the great lake Anavatapta near its center. On this idea, see Sadakata 1999, p. 33.
backThe Degé Kangyur here reads bab par ’dra bas; however, the Stok Palace version, which has been preferred, reads bab par ’dus pas. The Stok Palace reading also more closely aligns with the readings found in the Narthang and Choné Kangyurs: bab par’du pas.
backde’i gzhi ma nor ba’i rang gis [var.:gi] ngo bo ni chos de dag gi rang bzhin skye ba med pa yin no. Reading the variant gi, as found in the Yongle, Peking, and Lhasa Kangyur recensions of the text.
backchos rnams kyi dngos po rtag pa ther zug dang / med pa dang chad pa’i mtha’ gnyis po bsal na. A reference to the “two extremes of eternalism and nihilism,” more commonly known in Tibetan as rtag pa dang chad pa’i mtha’ gnyis, Skt. śāśvatānta ucchedānta.
backchos nyid rang gi ngo bo nyid las mi g.yo bar tha dad par thams cad snang ba’i mdo. The title given here differs slightly from the title given at the beginning of the sūtra, as explained in #UT22084-055-002-263.
backsde snod kyi bstan bcos dang dbu ma’i lta ba tha dad rnams ’di las’phros pa yin. The Stok Palace Kangyur does not contain the second sentence of the colophon. See #UT22084-055-002-259.
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